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Abstract The paper quantifies the amount of information aggregated by large elec-
tions under qualified majority rules. It shows show that, even when the Condorcet
Jury Theorem does not hold, there still can be meaningful information aggregation.
In particular, we study the case of information aggregation under rational ignorance
and with poorly informed voters.
Keywords Condorcet Jury theorem · probability of success · poor information ·
rational ignorance
1 Introduction
The Condorcet Jury Theorem considers a committee deciding among two alternatives
under majority rules, in a situation where one of the two decisions is the correct one,
members vote independently and they are more likely to have correct information
than incorrect one. This results consists of three main statements. The first one states
that the committee is more likely to select the correct decision than any individual
member. The second part states that the probability that the jury chooses the correct
decision is monotonically increasing with the size of the jury. Finally, the third part
states that the probability that the jury chooses the correct decision tends to one when
the jury size tends to infinity.1 This last part is the so called asymptotic version of the
theorem and provides an epistemic justification for a democratic form of government
(see Landemore 2012 for discussion and detailed references).
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This paper addresses an issue regarding the asymptotic form of the theorem that
has not been noted (to the author’s knowledge) in the literature. While many authors
have studied the conditions under which the theorem holds in its different versions
(see, for instance, Paroush 1998; Berend and Paroush 1998), nobody has attempted to
understand what happens when the asymptotic version of Condorcet Jury Theorem
does not hold. It is not clear why a situation where an electorate chooses the best
decision 99% of the times, should be classified a “democratic failure”. On the other
hand, we ought to be concerned if elections yielded the correct decision less than half
of the times. Current formulations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem do not allows us
to distinguish between the two cases. The paper tackles this issue and goes beyond
classical formulations of the Condorcet Jury theorem.
We consider a standard jury model with a fixed number of jurors and two alterna-
tives. The jury has to decide which alternative is selected using a qualified majority
rule.2 We assume that one of the two alternatives is correct. Before voting, jurors
do not know which alternative is correct, but have some private and independent in-
formation.3 Jurors are not strategic, but vote according to their private information.4
The competence of voters (i.e., the probability that a voter casts a correct vote) is het-
erogenous. We relax the standard assumption that voters are more likely to vote for
the right alternative than for the wrong one and allow competence to be less than one
half. Thus, our model includes the case where some of the voters follow unreliable
information (Mandler 2012 presents strategic foundations for this hypothesis).
Our main result determines the probability that a large electorate selects the cor-
rect decision, given a qualified majority rule. Thus, it provides a measure of the
amount of information aggregated by large elections. In particular, it generalizes the
main result in Berend and Paroush (1998) and extends it to supermajority rules.5
Our results are particularly helpful in understanding the effect of rational igno-
rance, of unreliable information and of outright irrational voters. The rational ig-
norance hypothesis (Schumpeter 1950; Downs 1957) states that electors have little
information since information acquisition is costly and each elector has little proba-
bility of being decisive. This is consistent with empirical evidence (see, for instance,
Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Nannestad and Paldam 2000). The literature casts
doubts about the ability of voters to select the correct information (see Hayes et al.
2015) and about the rationality of voters (see Caplan 2007). These facts could have
important implications for the quality of democratic deliberations. According to the
rational ignorance hypothesis, we should expect individual competence to be low and
to decrease with the number of voters. Our main result implies that the Condorcet
Jury Theorem holds in majoritarian elections as long as the average competence of
the electorate approaches one half at a rate that is slower than one over the square root
of the number of electors (see also Paroush 1998). However, there is meaningful (up
2 We exclude from our analysis the unanimity rule. Other papers dealing with qualified majority rules
are Nitzan and Paroush (1984); Fey (2003).
3 For analysis of the Condorcet Jury Theorem with correlated votes see Ladha (1992); Berg (1993);
Peleg and Zamir (2012).
4 The assumption is not without costs (see Austin-Smith and Banks 1996), but it is a standard one in
the literature about the Condorcet Jury Theorem.
5 See also Giuliano-Antonini (2005).
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to “almost complete”) information aggregation also when the average competence of
the electorate approaches one half at the same rate as the square root of the number
of electors. Our results complement the ones by Ben-Yashar and Zaavi (2011) and
Martinelli (2006) on the rational ignorance hypothesis. Our findings imply that even
a rational ignorant electorate could be able to make the correct decision with high
probability. Furthermore, we prove that there is meaningful information aggregation
even when some voters base their decision on incorrect information (or are irrational)
as long as their number is not too large relative to the committee size (see Mandler
2012 and Hayes et al. 2015). Our characterization is complete, so slight departures
from the hypothesis we employ can have dramatic effects.
The structure of the paper is the following: Section ?? presents the model, Section
?? presents the main results, Section ?? presents the applications to poorly informed
electorates and Section ?? concludes.
2 The model
There is a committee of n voters. They have to decide between two alternatives, A
and B. Without loss of generality, we assume that A is the correct alternative. Let
β ∈ [0,1] be the fraction of the electorate required to choose an alternative. That is, at
least dβne electors are required to elect alternative A, where dxe denotes the smallest
integer greater or equal to x: formally dxe = min{n ∈ N | n≥ x}. If only dβne− 1
electors vote for A, A is selected with probability α ∈ [0,1).6 Probability α is a tie-
breaking rule. If less than dβne−1 electors vote for A, then alternative B is selected.
Such a qualified majority rule is known as a β -rule. For instance, the cases where
β = 0 and β = 1, correspond to unanimity rules and the case where β n = 12 +
1
n cor-
responds to majority rule. Notice that the qualified majority rule can depend on the
size of the committee. For simplicity, we consider only sequences of qualified ma-
jority rules {β n}n≥1 such that limn→+∞β n = β for some β ∈ (0,1). We thus exclude
from our analysis the unanimity rules. We also assume that the tie-breaking rule α is
constant.
Electors vote independently, but the probability each elector votes for an alterna-
tive can depend on her identity. For every i ≥ 1, let pi, be the probability elector
i votes correctly (which is, for alternative A). Probability pi is called agent i com-
petence. Let p¯n = 1n ∑
n
i=1 pi be the average competence of a committee of size n
and set σn = (∑ni=1 pi (1− pi))
1
2 . Let Φ be the standard normal distribution: Φ (x) =
1√
2pi
∫ x
−∞ e
− t22 dt.
Differently than most literature about the Condorcet Jury theorem, we do not assume
that electors are more likely to be right than wrong, but simply that their competence
is uniformly bounded below by a small positive number. Thus, we allow also for
systematic mistakes and outright irrational behavior. Formally, we assume that there
exist a real number 0 < ε < 12 and an integer m such that pi ≥ ε for all for all i≥ m.
Let Pβ n,α
({pi}i≥1) be the probability that the elections select A when a β n-rule is
used, the tie-breaking rule is α , when there are n electors and every agent i votes for
6 The case α = 1 is equivalent to an increase in β of 1n .
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A with probability pi.
If the classical statement of the asymptotical form of the Condorcet Jury Theorem
holds, which is if limn→+∞Pβ n,α
({pi}i≥1)= 1, we say that the Condorcet Jury The-
orem holds in its strong form. If elections are more likely to select the correct decision
than the wrong one, which is if limn→+∞Pβ n,α
({pi}i≥1) > 12 , we say that the Con-
dorcet Jury Theorem holds in a weak form.
3 General Results
We open this section with a motivating example. Berend and Paroush (1998) prove
that, under our hypothesis, the the Condorcet Jury Theorem holds in its strong form
in majoritarian elections if and only if limn→+∞
√
n
(
p¯n− 12
)
=+∞. However we do
not know what happens when this condition does not hold.
Example 1 Consider majoritarian elections and the following committees.
(i) Let pi = 12 +min
{
0.6√
i
, 14
}
for every i ≥ 1. Summing up the inequalities 1√
i+1
≤∫ i+1
i
1√
t dt ≤ 1√i from i = 1 to i = n, we obtain ∑
n
i=1
1√
i
≈ 2√n for large n. This fact
implies that p¯n− 12 ≈ 1.2√n for large n. Thus, limn→∞
√
n
(
p¯n− 12
)
= 1.2.
(ii) Let qi = 12 +min
{ 1
i ,
1
4
}
, for every i ≥ 1. Summing up the inequalities 1i+1 ≤∫ i+1
i
1
t dt ≤ 1i+1 from i = 1 to i = n, we obtain ∑ni=1 1i ≈ logn. We have q¯n− 12 ≈ 1n .
We have limn→∞
√
n
(
q¯n− 12
)
= 0.
The Condorcet Jury Theorem does not hold in its strong form in case (i) and in
case (ii). However the “centered competence” of the electorate
√
n
(
p¯n− 12
)
in case
(i) is infinitely larger than the “centered competence” of the electorate
√
n
(
q¯n− 12
)
in case (ii) since limn→+∞
p¯n− 12
q¯n− 12
=+∞.
The first result result determines the the probability large elections yield the cor-
rect decision, depending on the asymptotic behavior of the ratio nσn (p¯n−β ), for any
sequence of qualified majority rules converging to β . Such a probability is a natural
measure of the amount of information aggregated by large elections.
Theorem 1 Let {β n}n≥1 be a sequence of qualified majority rules such that
limn→+∞β n = β for some β ∈ (0,1) and let α be a tie-breaking rule. Let tn =
n
σn (p¯n−β ). Assume that limn→+∞ tn = t exists. Then limn→+∞Pβ n,α
({pi}i≥1)=Φ (t).
Proof Let σ = limn→+∞σn, there are two cases.
(i) First, assume σ =+∞. Let tˆn =
p¯n− dβ
nne
n
σn . Notice limn→+∞ tˆn = limn→+∞ tn = t. For
every voter i, define the following random variable:
Xi = 1− pi, if voter i votes for A;
Xi =−pi, if voter i votes for B.
We have: E [Xi] = pi, E
[
X2i
]
= pi (1− pi),
∣∣E ∣∣X3i ∣∣∣∣= pi (1− pi)(1+2p2i −2pi).
Set Sn =
∑ni=1 Xi
σn .
Alternative A is selected with certainty if Sn +
∑ni=1 pi
σn ≥
dβ nne
σn , which is if and only
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Sn ≥ n
dβnne
n −p¯n
σn =−tˆn. Alternative A is selected with probability α if Sn =−tˆn− 1nσn .
Thus, the probability that alternative A is selected is
P(Sn ≥−tˆn)+α
[
P
(
Sn =−tˆn− 1nσn
)]
.
From the Berry-Esseen theorem (see Chow and Teicher, 1997, p. 322) it follows that
there exists C, such that
|P(Sn ≤ x)−Φ (x)| ≤C∑
n
i=1 pi (1− pi)
(
1+2p2i −2pi
)
σ3n
for every x and for every n. Since limn→+∞σn =+∞ and∑ni=1 pi (1− pi)
(
1+2p2i −2pi
)
<
σ2n , we have limn→+∞ |P(Sn ≤−tˆn)−Φ (−tˆn)|= 0 and limn→+∞P(Sn =−tˆn) = 0.
(ii)Now, assume that σ2 <+∞. Since pi ≥ ε for all i large enough, then limi→+∞ pi =
1. It follows that limn→+∞ tn =+∞. We prove that limn→+∞Pβ nα
({pi}i≤n)= 1.
Consider the following ancillary model where pˆi = 1− ε if pi ≥ 1− ε and pˆi = pi
otherwise. Since pˆi ≥ 1− ε for large enough i, we have ∑ni=1 pˆi ≈ n(1− ε) and
∑ni=1 pˆi (1− pˆi) ≈ nε (1− ε) as n→ +∞. Thus, limn→+∞ ∑
n
i=1 pˆi(1−pˆi)|2pˆi−1|
[∑ni=1 pˆi(1−pˆi)]
3
2
= 0 and
limn→+∞
(∑ni=1 pˆi)−dβne
[∑ni=1 pˆi(1−pˆi)]
1
2
=+∞. The Berry-Esseen theorem implies that the probabil-
ity that at least dβne agents vote for A approaches one in this ancillary model, when
n→+∞.
For every i, set Pidβne−1 =∑k≥dβ nne−1,{i1,...,ik}∪{ik+1,..,in}=N\{i}∏
k
r=1 pir ∏
n
r=k+1 (1− pis)
and set Pidβ nne = ∑k≥dβne,{i1,...,ik}∪{ik+1,..,in}=N\{i}∏
k
r=1 pir ∏
n
r=k+1 (1− pis). Then the
probability that at least dβne agents vote for A can be written as pi
(
Pidβne−1−Pidβne
)
+
Pidβne. It follows that the probability that A wins is increasing in pi, P
i
dβne−1 ≥ Pidβnefor
every i,. Since pˆi≤ pi for all i≤ n, the probability probability that at least dβne agents
vote for A approaches one when n→ +∞ in the original model as well, which com-
pletes the proof of the claim.
In particular, Theorem ?? can help us in assessing the failures of the Condorcet
Jury Theorem. For instance, it makes it possible to clearly distinguish between case
(i) and case (ii) in Example ??.
Example 2 Consider the committees of Example ??.
(i) Notice that σn ≈
√
n
2 . It follows that limn→+∞ tn = 2.4. Thus Theorem ?? implies
that the committee selects the best decision with probability above 0.99, when there
are many voters.
(ii) In this case limn→+∞ tn = 0. Thus, Theorem ?? implies that the committee selects
the best decision only with probability arbitrarily close to 12 when there are many
voters.
Next, we consider the assumption that a sufficient number of voters are neither
too dumb nor too smart (see Berend and Paroush 1998).
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Assumption 1 Assume that there exist C> 0, δ > 0 such that |{i≤ n : δ ≤ pi ≤ 1−δ}|>
Cn for large enough n.
Under this assumption we can extend the finding of Theorem 1 in Berend and
Paroush (1998) to the case of supermajority rules.
Proposition 1 Let {β n}n≥1 be a sequence of qualified majority rules such that
limn→+∞β n = β for some β ∈ (0,1) and let α be a tie-breaking rule. Then, under
assumption ??, the Condorcet Jury Theorem holds in its strong form if and only if
limn→+∞
√
n(p¯n−β ) = +∞.
Proof Notice that nσn (p¯n−β )=
√
n(p¯n−β )√ σn
n
. Observe that σ2n ≥{i≤ n : δ ≤ pi ≤ 1−δ}δ >
δCn. Furthermore σ2n ≤ n because pi (1− pi)≤ 1 for all i. It follows that
√
n(p¯n−β )√
δC
≤
√
n(p¯n−β )√
σ2n
n
≤√n(p¯n−β ) which implies the claim.
Proposition ?? implies that when the mean competence is uniformly bounded
above the β , the Condorcet Jury Theorem holds in its strong, which yields a classical
statement of the Theorem for supermajority rules (see Fey 2003).
Corollary 1 Let {β n}n≥1 be a sequence of qualified majority rules such that limn→+∞β n =
β for some β ∈ (0,1) and let α be a tie-breaking rule. Assume there exists δ > 0, such
that p¯n > β +δ for large enough n, then the Condorcet Jury theorem holds.
4 Information aggregation by a poorly informed electorate
The quality information voters have (which is their competence) can influence the
performance of a voting body. The rational ignorance hypothesis suggests that we
should expect voters to have small amounts of information. The reason is that electors
are very unlikely to be pivotal so they acquire very little information (see Martinelli
2006 for non-cooperative foundations of this claim). Theorem ?? allows us to gauge
the effect of this hypothesis on the performance of large elections. Example ??, (i),
shows that even a poorly informed electorate can take accurate decision with high
probability. Indeed, the sufficient condition determined in Corollary ?? are not at all
necessary for meaningful information aggregation.
Proposition 2 Let {β n}n≥1 be a sequence of qualified majority rules such that
limn→+∞β n = β for some β ∈ (0,1) and let α be a tie-breaking rule. Then, under
Assumption ??, the Condorcet Jury Theorem holds in a weak form if and only if
limn→+∞
√
n(p¯n−β )> 0.
Proof Notice that n√σn (p¯n−β )=
√
n(p¯n−β )√ σn
n
. Observe that σn≥{i≤ n : δ ≤ pi ≤ 1−δ}δ >
δCn. Furthermore σn ≤ n because pi (1− pi)≤ 1 for all i. It follows that
√
n(p¯n−β )√
δC
≤
√
n(p¯n−β )√ σn
n
which implies the claim.
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Ben-Yashar and Zahavi (2011) present a model of committee with rational unin-
formed voters and study whether adding an informed voters improve the performance
of the committee. However, both theoretical and empirical literature suggest that we
should also consider situations where at least some agents base their votes on mis-
taken information (see Mandler 2012; Hayes et al. 2015; Lee et al. 2016). Thus, we
generalize Ben-Yashar and Zahavi (2011) model in order to consider this case and
study its asymptotical implications. More precisely, we consider an electorate of size
n where there are Kn informed voters voting for the right alternative with probability
p > 12 , Hn misinformed voters voting for the right alternative with probability q <
1
2
and n−Kn−Hn uninformed voters voting for the right alternative with probability
1
2 . In order to provide a clearer comparison of our results with the ones obtained in
Ben-Yashar and Zahavi (2011), we only consider majority rule. However, the result
can be easily generalized to any qualified majority rule.7
Proposition 3 Let 0 < q < 12 < p < 1. Let pi ∈
{ 1
2 , p,q
}
, for all i ≥ 0. Let Kn =
|{i≤ n | pi = p}| be the number of informed electors when the committee size is n.
Let Hn = |{i≤ n | pi = q}| be the number of misinformed electors when the commit-
tee size is n.8 Assume that the majority rule and any tie-breaking rule are used. Then
(i) if limn→+∞ Kn√n =+∞ and limn→+∞Kn
(
p− 12
)
+Hn
(
q− 12
)
=+∞, then the Con-
dorcet Jury Theorem holds in its strong form;
(ii) if limn→+∞ Kn√n = +∞ and limn→+∞Kn
(
p− 12
)
+Hn
(
q− 12
)
= C ∈ (−∞+∞) ,
then limn→+∞Pβ n,α
({pi}i≥1)= 12 ;
(iii) if limn→+∞ Kn√n =+∞ and limn→+∞Kn
(
p− 12
)
+Hn
(
q− 12
)
=−∞, then limn→+∞
Pβ n,α
({pi}i≥1)= 0;
(iv) if limn→+∞ Kn√n =C1 ∈ [0,+∞) and limn→+∞ Hn√n =C2 ∈ [0,+∞), then limn→+∞Pβ n,α({pi}i≥1)=Φ
(
C1(p− 12 )+C2(q− 12 )√
C1 p(1−p)+C2q(1−q)+ 14
)
∈ (0,1);
(v) if limn→+∞ Kn√n =C∈ [0,+∞) and limn→+∞ Hn√n =+∞, then limn→+∞Pβ n,α
({pi}i≥1)=
0.
Proof Observe that p¯n = 12 +
Kn
n
(
p− 12
)
+ Hnn
(
q− 12
)
and that σ2n = Kn p(1− p)+
Hnq(1−q)+ 14 (n−Kn−Hn).
It follows that nσn
(
p¯n− 12
)
=
Kn(p− 12 )+Hn(q− 12 )√
Kn p(1−p)+Hnq(1−q)+ 14 (n−Kn−Hn)
. Thus, the claims fol-
low from applying Theorem ??
First, consider Ben-Yashar and Zahavi (2011) model, which is assume Hn = 0 for
every n. Parts (a) and (c) in Proposition ?? imply that the asymptotical Condorcet
Jury Theorem holds (in its strong form or in a weak form) if and only if the number
of informed voters grows at least at the same rate as the square root of the number of
voters. When we consider misinformed voters, this condition is necessary but not suf-
ficient for meaningful information aggregation. Indeed, the number of misinformed
7 The precise statementent and the proof is available upon request.
8 The symbol |X | denotes the cardinality of set X .
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voters cannot grow too fast. More precisely, we need that limn→+∞ KnHn ≥
1
2−q
p− 12
. On the
contrary, when this condition is not satisfied, due to the (relative) preponderance of
misinformed electors, elections are more likely to reach the wrong decision than the
right one.
An alternative view of a rationally uninformed electorate is the one where every
voter has a small amount of information, formally a situation where limn→+∞ p¯n≤ 12 .9
In this situtation, electors are only slightly more likely to vote for the correct alter-
native than for the wrong one. Paroush (1998) and Example ?? show that under this
condition the Condorcet Jury Theorem does not hold in its strong form, in general.
However, Example ?? also shows that this failure includes very different situations,
from the case where the committee takes the right decision 99% of the times to the
case where the committee does not perform better than the toss of a fair coin. Actu-
ally, for any precision level x there exists a poorly informed electorate (which is an
electorate such that limn→+∞ p¯n ≤ 12 ) that selects the correct decision with probability
arbitrarily close to x. The proof of the result is constructive.
Proposition 4 Let {β n}n≥1 be a sequence of qualified majority rules such that
limn→+∞β n = β for some β ∈ (0,1) and let α be a tie-breaking rule. Let t ∈ [0,1].
Then there exists {pi}i≥1 such that limn→+∞ p¯n≤ β and limn→+∞Pβ n,α
({pi}i≥1)= t.
Proof First consider the case t = 0 and let 0 < p < β . Set pi = p for all i≥ 1. Then,
Theorem ?? implies that limn→∞Pβ n,α
({pi}i≥1)= 0.
The case t = 12 is covered by Example ??, (ii) and Example ??, (ii).
Now consider t = 1 and let ρ be such that β < ρ < 1. Set pi = min
{
β + 13√i ,ρ
}
for
all i ≥ 1. Summing up the inequalities 13√i+1 ≤
∫ i+1
i
1
3√t dt ≤
1
3√i from i = 1 to i = n,
we obtain p¯n−β ≈ 23 3√n . Then, Theorem ?? implies that limn→∞Pβ n,α
({pi}i≥1)= 1.
Now assume that t ∈ (0,1)\{ 12}. Set√β (1−β )Φ−1(t)2 , let 0 < ρ < min{β ,1−β}
and let pi =max
{
ρ,min
{
β + C√
i
,1−ρ
}}
. For large n, p¯n−β ≈ 2C√n (see Example??).
Furthermore, for large n, σn ≈
√
nβ (1−β ).
It follows that limn→∞ nσn (p¯n−β ) = 2C√β (1−β ) . Then, Theorem ?? implies that
limn→∞Pβ n,α
({pi}i≥1)=Φ( 2C√β (1−β )
)
= t.
An analogous result result can be obtained employing rationally uninformed elec-
torates as introduced by Ben-Yashar and Zahavi (2011) (after adjusting for misin-
formed voters) as an almost straightforward application of Proposition ??.10
5 Conclusions
In this paper we extend the Condorcet Jury Theorem by deriving the probability
that an electorate reaches the correct decision, under any qualified majority rule,
9 This model is consistent with the predictions of Martinelli (2006) for a strategic setup.
10 The proof is available upon request.
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which provides a measure of the amount of information aggregated by large elections.
The results shed new light on information aggregation by rationally uninformed and
poorly informed electorates.
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